Gravelle, Hugh Stanley Emrys orcid.org/0000-0002-7753-4233, Siciliani, Luigi orcid.org/0000-0003-1739-7289 and Moscelli, Guiseppe (Accepted: 2020) Hospital competition and quality for non-emergency patients in the English NHS. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS. ISSN 0741-6261 (In Press)
Abstract
We investigate the effect on the quality of three high-volume non-emergency treatments of a reform that relaxed restrictions on patient choice of hospital. We employ a quasi difference-in difference strategy and use control functions to allow for time-varying patient selection into providers correlated with unobserved morbidity. After the reform, public hospitals facing more rivals reduced quality, increased waiting times, and reduced length of stay for hip and knee replacements. This is likely due to regulated prices implying larger losses on these treatments compared to coronary artery bypass grafts where no effects were found. Our findings are robust to estimation methods, competition measures, and allowing for entry of private providers.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Centre for Health Economics (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 28 Oct 2020 14:40 |
Last Modified: | 13 Mar 2025 05:27 |
Status: | In Press |
Refereed: | Yes |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:167305 |
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