Barlassina, L. (2020) Beyond good and bad: reflexive imperativism, not evaluativism, explains valence. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 9 (4). pp. 274-284. ISSN 2161-2234
Abstract
Evaluativism by Carruthers and reflexive imperativism by Barlassina and Hayward agree that valence—the (un)pleasantness of experiences—is a natural kind shared across all affective states. But they disagree about what valence is. For evaluativism, an experience is pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of representing its worldly object as good/bad; for reflexive imperativism, an experience is pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of commanding its subject to get more/less of itself. I argue that reflexive imperativism is superior to evaluativism according to Carruthers's own standards. He maintains that a theory of valence should account for its phenomenology and role in imagination‐based decision‐making. I show that it is reflexive imperativism, rather than evaluativism, that fits this explanatory bill.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2020 The Thought Trust and Wiley Periodicals LLC. This is an author-produced version of a paper subsequently published in Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | affect; affective forecasting; decision making; evaluativism; imperativism; pain; phenomenal character; pleasure; valence |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 21 Oct 2020 13:46 |
Last Modified: | 10 Nov 2022 01:13 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1002/tht3.471 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:166774 |