Borm, Peter, Funaki, Yukihiko and Ju, Yuan orcid.org/0000-0002-7541-9856 (2020) The Balanced Threat Agreement for Individual Externality Negotiation Problems. Homo Oeconomicus. pp. 1-19. ISSN 2366-6161
Abstract
This paper introduces a model to analyze individual externalities and the associated negotiation problem, which has been largely neglected in the game theoretic literature. Following an axiomatic perspective, we propose a solution, as a payoff sharing scheme, called the balanced threat agreement, for such problems. It highlights an agent’s potential influences on all agents by threatening to enter or quit. We further study the solution by investigating its consistency. We also offer a discussion on the related stability issue.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s) 2020 |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 01 Jun 2020 14:50 |
Last Modified: | 16 Oct 2024 16:39 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00097-7 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s41412-020-00097-7 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:161433 |