Implicit bias and epistemic vice

This chapter starts by sketching the contours of implicit biases, and then turns to the recent claim, from Cassam, that implicit biases are epistemic vices. Implicit biases are heterogeneous phenomena. Authors tend to point to various features that implicit biases share: they operate quickly and automatically, they may be difficult for the agent to control or be aware of, they may be arational or limited in the extent to which they are guided by the norms that govern other mental states. Cassam is also explicit that cognitive biases, including implicit biases, may also be candidates for epistemic vice. Drawing on the idea that implicit biases are ‘habits of thought’ Cassam argues that implicit biases can be understood as epistemically harmful attitudes. Implicit biases in an individual’s mental economy don’t appear to produce the relevant (bad) consequences with the required systematicity to establish them as epistemic vices.