Olson, E. and Witt, K. (2020) Against Person Essentialism. Mind, 129 (515). pp. 715-735. ISSN 0026-4423
Abstract
It is widely held that every person is a person essentially, where being a person is having special mental properties such as intelligence and self-consciousness. It follows that nothing can acquire or lose these properties. The paper argues that this rules out all familiar psychological-continuity views of personal identity over time. It also faces grave difficulties in accounting for the mental powers of human beings who are not intelligent and self-conscious, such as foetuses and those with dementia.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2020 Olson and Witt. This is an author-produced version of a paper subsequently published in Mind. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 15 Apr 2020 15:34 |
Last Modified: | 22 Jun 2022 00:13 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press (OUP) |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/mind/fzaa016 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:159376 |