Ingram, David orcid.org/0000-0002-0184-9271 (2016) Platonism, Alienation, and Negativity. Erkenntnis. 1273–1285. ISSN 1572-8420
Abstract
A platonic theory of possibility states that truths about what’s possible are determined by facts about properties not being instantiated (or being ‘uninstantiated’). Recently, Matthew Tugby has argued in favour of this sort of theory, arguing that adopting a platonic theory of possibility allows us to solve a paradox concerning alien properties: properties that might have been instantiated, but aren’t actually. In this paper, I raise a worry for Tugby’s proposal (and the platonic theory, more generally)—that it commits us to negative facts playing an important truth-making role—and offer a strategy to avoid the objectionable negativity.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | The Author(s) 2015. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 12 Feb 2020 09:20 |
Last Modified: | 17 Dec 2024 00:15 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9794-2 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s10670-015-9794-2 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:156879 |
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