Gustafsson, Carl Johan Eric orcid.org/0000-0002-9618-577X (2020) The Sequential Dominance Argument for the Independence Condition of Expected Utility Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. ISSN 0031-8205
Abstract
Independence is the condition that, if X is preferred to Y, then a lottery between X and Z is preferred to a lottery between Y and Z given the same probability of Z. Is it rationality required that one’s preferences conform to Independence? The main objection to this requirement is that it would rule out the alleged rationality of Allais and Ellsberg Preferences. In this paper, I put forward a sequential dominance argument with fairly weak assumptions for a variant of Independence (called Independence for Constant Prospects), which shows that Allais and Ellsberg Preferences are irrational. Hence this influential objection (that is, the alleged rationality of Allais and Ellsberg Preferences) can be rebutted. I also put forward a number of sequential dominance arguments that various versions of Independence are requirements of rationality. One of these arguments is based on very minimal assumptions, but the arguments for the versions of Independence which are strong enough to serve in the standard axiomatization of Expected Utility Theory need notably stronger assumptions.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2020 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Inc. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 15 Nov 2019 16:10 |
Last Modified: | 08 Feb 2025 00:35 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12669 |
Status: | Published online |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/phpr.12669 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:153545 |
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