Lanari Bo, Inacio and Hakimov, Rustamdjan (2020) Iterative Versus Standard Deferred Acceptance:Experimental Evidence. The Economic Journal. 356–392. ISSN 1468-0297
Abstract
We test experimentally the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus two versions of the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), in which students make applications one at a time. A significantly higher proportion of stable outcomes is reached under IDAM than under DA. The difference can be explained by a higher proportion of subjects following an equilibrium truthful strategy under iterative mechanisms than the dominant strategy of truthful reporting under DA. We associate the benefits of iterative mechanisms with the feedback on the outcome of the previous application they provide to students between steps.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 23 Oct 2019 14:50 |
Last Modified: | 16 Oct 2024 16:09 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uez036 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/ej/uez036 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:152595 |