Lanari Bo, Inacio (2016) Fair implementation of diversity in school choice. Games and Economic Behaviour. pp. 54-63. ISSN 0899-8256
Abstract
Many school districts have objectives regarding how students of different races, ethnicity or religious backgrounds should be distributed across schools. A growing literature in mechanism design is introducing school choice mechanisms that attempt to satisfy those requirements. We show that mechanisms based on the student-proposing deferred acceptance may fail to satisfy those objectives, but that by using instead the school-proposing deferred acceptance together with a choice function used by the schools, which incorporates a preference for satisfying them, can optimally approximate the diversity objectives while still satisfying an appropriate fairness criterion. We provide analytical results which show that the proposed mechanism has a general ability to satisfy those objectives, as opposed to some currently proposed mechanisms, which may yield segregated assignments.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2016 Elsevier Inc. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 23 Oct 2019 14:30 |
Last Modified: | 06 Jan 2025 00:14 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.003 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.003 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:152588 |
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