Marsili, N. orcid.org/0000-0001-7853-7359 (2019) The norm of assertion : a ‘constitutive’ rule? Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy, 66 (5). pp. 799-820. ISSN 0020-174X
Abstract
According to an influential hypothesis, the speech act of assertion is subject to a single ‘constitutive’ rule, that takes the form: ‘One must: assert that p only if p has C’. Scholars working on assertion interpret the assumption that this rule is ‘constitutive’ in different ways. This disagreement, often unacknowledged, threatens the foundations of the philosophical debate on assertion. This paper reviews different interpretations of the claim that assertion is governed by a constitutive rule. It argues that once we understand the full import of assuming that assertion is governed by a constitutive rule, it becomes clear that some fundamental assumptions of the current debate are mistaken, and others unwarranted.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an author-produced version of a paper subsequently published in Inquiry. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Assertion; norms; speech act theory; constitutive rules; Testimony |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 21 Oct 2019 10:01 |
Last Modified: | 23 May 2024 07:54 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1080/0020174x.2019.1667868 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:152355 |