Batrancea, L, Nichita, A, Olsen, J et al. (56 more authors) (2019) Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations. Journal of Economic Psychology, 74. 102191. ISSN 0167-4870
Abstract
The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an author produced version of a paper published in the Journal of Economic Psychology. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Trust; Power; Slippery slope framework; Tax compliance; Tax evasion |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Business (Leeds) > Management Division (LUBS) (Leeds) > Management Division Decision Research (LUBS) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 01 Oct 2019 14:52 |
Last Modified: | 16 Jan 2021 01:38 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.joep.2019.102191 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:151470 |