Ratcliffe, Matthew James orcid.org/0000-0003-4519-4833 (2019) Emotional Intentionality. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements. pp. 251-269. ISSN 1358-2461
Abstract
This paper sketches an account of what distinguishes emotional intentionality from other forms of intentionality. I focus on the ‘two-sided’ structure of emotional experience. Emotions such as being afraid of something and being angry about something involve intentional states with specific contents. However, experiencing an entity, event, or situation in a distinctively emotional way also includes a wider-ranging disturbance of the experiential world within which the object of emotion is encountered. I consider the nature of this disturbance and its relationship to the localized content of an emotional experience.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2019. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 18 Sep 2019 13:50 |
Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2025 23:18 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246118000784 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1017/S1358246118000784 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:150602 |
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Description: Emotional Intentionality Draft 2 July 2018