Marsili, N. orcid.org/0000-0001-7853-7359 (2019) Immoral lies and partial beliefs. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 65 (1). ISSN 0020-174X
Abstract
In a recent article, Krauss (2017) raises some fundamental questions concerning (i) what the desiderata of a definition of lying are, and (ii) how definitions of lying can account for partial beliefs. This paper aims to provide an adequate answer to both questions. Regarding (i), it shows that there can be a tension between two desiderata for a definition of lying: ‘descriptive accuracy’ (meeting intuitions about our ordinary concept of lying), and ‘moral import’ (meeting intuitions about what is wrong with lying), vindicating the primacy of the former desideratum. Regarding (ii), it shows that Krauss’ proposed ‘worse-off requirement’ meets neither of these desiderata, whereas the ‘comparative insincerity condition’ (Marsili 2014) can meet both. The conclusion is that lies are assertions that the speaker takes to be more likely to be false than true, and their distinctive blameworthiness is a function of the extent to which they violate a sincerity norm.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an author-produced version of a paper subsequently published in Inquiry. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Lying; Credences; Moral Concepts; Definitions; Norms |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 02 Sep 2019 10:36 |
Last Modified: | 23 May 2024 07:55 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1080/0020174X.2019.1667865 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:150256 |