Olson, E.T. (2018) Swinburne’s brain transplants. Philosophia Christi, 20 (1). pp. 21-29. ISSN 1529-1634
Abstract
Richard Swinburne argues that if my cerebral hemispheres were each transplanted into a different head, what would happen to me is not determined by my material parts, and I must therefore have an immaterial part. The paper argues that this argument relies on modal claims that Swinburne has not established. And the means he proposes for establishing such claims cannot succeed.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2018 Philosophy Documentation Center. This is an author-produced version of a paper subsequently published in Philosophia Christi. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 13 Aug 2019 10:13 |
Last Modified: | 15 Aug 2019 07:48 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Philosophy Documentation Center |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.5840/pc20182014 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:149628 |