Gustafsson, Carl Johan Eric orcid.org/0000-0002-9618-577X (2020) Dennett and Taylor’s Alleged Refutation of the Consequence Argument. Analysis. pp. 1-8. ISSN 0003-2638
Abstract
Daniel C. Dennett has long maintained that the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is confused. In a joint work with Christopher Taylor, he claims to have shown that the argument is based on a failure to understand Logic 101. Given a fairly plausible account of having the power to cause something, they claim that an inference rule that the argument relies on is invalid. In this paper, I show that Dennett and Taylor’s refutation does not work against a better, more standard version of the Consequence Argument. Hence Dennett and Taylor’s alleged refutation fails.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 25 Jul 2019 11:20 |
Last Modified: | 08 Feb 2025 00:34 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz048 |
Status: | Published online |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/analys/anz048 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:149029 |
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