Spencer, DA orcid.org/0000-0002-7803-6105 (2020) Economics and ‘bad’ management: the limits to performativity. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 44 (1). pp. 17-32. ISSN 0309-166X
Abstract
The performative power of mainstream economic theories (notably agency theory and transaction cost economics) has been criticised by researchers within management studies. The latter blame these theories for creating ‘bad’ management in real-world organisations and call for their removal from business schools. This paper questions this line of criticism. It argues that mainstream economic theories have condoned more than created ‘bad’ management. It also questions whether ‘bad’ management can be negated by ousting these theories from business schools. Rather it is argued that ‘bad’ management has deep roots within organisations—specifically, it reflects on how organisations are run by and in the interests of capital owners. The possibilities for securing comparatively enlightened or ‘good’ forms of management are seen as necessarily limited by capitalist ownership relations. The paper argues that the transformation of management will require wider reforms in—and importantly beyond—business schools.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | (c) 2019, The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved. This is an author produced version of a paper published in the Cambridge Journal of Economics. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Performativity, Economics, Business schools, Bad management, Capitalism |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Business (Leeds) > Economics Division (LUBS) (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 19 Jul 2019 14:00 |
Last Modified: | 04 Jul 2021 00:38 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/cje/bez033 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:148512 |