Skovoroda, R., Bruce, A., Buck, T. et al. (1 more author) (2019) Cost-efficient performance-vesting equity. Economics Letters, 182. pp. 37-39. ISSN 0165-1765
Abstract
We analyze the incentive effects of the Performance-Vesting Equity (PVE) component of executive pay that is characterized by zero exercise price and performance-contingent vesting. We demonstrate how PVE with upward-sloping convex/concave vesting curves can be a more efficient risk-sharing and incentive alignment device than strictly convex stock options.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Authors/Creators: |
|
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2019 Elsevier. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Economics Letters. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). |
Keywords: | Executive compensation; Incentive pay; Performance-Vesting Equity |
Dates: |
|
Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 05 Jul 2019 15:28 |
Last Modified: | 05 Dec 2020 01:39 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.06.002 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:148217 |