Mohamed, A and Schwienbacher, A (2016) Voluntary disclosure of corporate venture capital investments. Journal of Banking & Finance, 68. pp. 69-83. ISSN 0378-4266
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate drivers of corporate venture capital investment announcements. Consistent with voluntary information disclosure theories, we find that a public announcement is less likely to be made when the start-up firm is in the seed stage but more likely when the parent company is large, active in concentrated markets and in non-high-tech industries; spends heavily on internal R&D and capital expenditures; has low leverage ratio; and faces more information asymmetry problems. In addition, corporate venture capital programs managed externally disclose more often than internal programs. We find that parent companies facing more severe asymmetric information problems enjoy the highest abnormal returns in response to announcements. This study contributes to the literature on voluntary information disclosure in that it evidences that larger corporations use disclosure of some of their investments in innovative startups strategically as a way to convey valuable information to the market.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2016 Elsevier B.V. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Journal of Banking & Finance. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Information disclosure; Public announcements; Corporate venture capital |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Business (Leeds) > Accounting & Finance Division (LUBS) (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 21 Jun 2019 09:41 |
Last Modified: | 03 Jul 2019 01:09 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.03.001 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:147578 |