A legally pluralist approach to the Bakassi Peninsula case

Considerations of legal pluralism and human rights do not go readily hand in hand – on the face of it, they appear to have different core concerns and motivations, with the former being conceptual in character while the latter is normative. This chapter argues, however, that a reading of human rights as being solely about universal norms is an overly narrow one, and that a more nuanced approach – one that reflects upon the operation of human rights norms within varied, co-existing and overlapping legal regimes – is required. It employs the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case of the Bakassi Peninsula (2002) as grounds on which to consider fertile intersections of legal pluralism and human rights, with a focus on two particular issues: first, the challenge of addressing contemporary border disputes that can trace their origins to colonialisation, and; second, the matter of human rights’ effectiveness in producing changes to international legal mechanisms and practices. In choosing an ICJ case as its study, this chapter draws attention to the purportedly neutral definitions, practices and forums that permeate both international law and international human rights law, and presents legal pluralism as a vital resource in both recognising and combatting such default settings.