Who goes first? Strategic delay under information asymmetry

Achim, Peter (2018) Who goes first? Strategic delay under information asymmetry. Theoretical Economics. pp. 341-375. ISSN 1555-7561

Abstract

Metadata

Item Type: Article
Authors/Creators:
  • Achim, Peter (peter.achim@york.ac.uk)
Keywords: social learning,Strategic delay
Dates:
  • Published (online): 1 February 2018
  • Accepted: 10 February 2017
Institution: The University of York
Academic Units: The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York)
Depositing User: Pure (York)
Date Deposited: 15 Feb 2019 17:10
Last Modified: 22 Nov 2024 00:35
Published Version: https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2171
Status: Published online
Refereed: Yes
Identification Number: 10.3982/TE2171
Related URLs:
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID):

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