Sullivan-Bissett, Ema Louise and Noordhof, Paul Jonathan Pitt orcid.org/0000-0001-5222-2439 (2019) The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief. Philosophical Studies. pp. 1-15. ISSN 0031-8116
Abstract
We argue that the most plausible characterisation of the norm of truth—it is permissible to believe that p if and only if p is true—is unable to explain Transparency in doxastic deliberation, a task for which it is claimed to be equipped. In addition, the failure of the norm to do this work undermines the most plausible account of how the norm guides belief formation at all. Those attracted to normativism about belief for its perceived explanatory credentials had better look elsewhere.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s) 2019 |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 15 Feb 2019 15:50 |
Last Modified: | 16 Oct 2024 15:30 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01242-y |
Status: | Published online |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s11098-019-01242-y |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:142607 |
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