Piller, Christian Johannes orcid.org/0000-0001-9883-641X (2019) Beware of Safety. Analytic Philosophy. pp. 307-355. ISSN 2153-960X
Abstract
Safety, as discussed in contemporary epistemology, is a feature of true beliefs. Safe beliefs, when formed by the same method, remain true in close-by possible worlds. I argue that our beliefs being safely true serves no recognisable epistemic interest and, thus, that this notion of safety should play no role in epistemology. Epistemologists have been misled by failing to distinguish between a feature of beliefs — being safely true — and a feature of believers, namely being safe from error. The latter is central to our epistemic endeavours: we want to be able to get right answers, whatever they are, to questions of interest. I argue that we are sufficiently safe from error (in some relevant domain) by being sufficiently sensitive (to relevant distinctions).
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details. |
Keywords: | safety, sensitvity, knowledge, epistemology, epistemic interest |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 20 Dec 2018 15:40 |
Last Modified: | 26 Feb 2025 00:05 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12164 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/phib.12164 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:140302 |
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