Galizzi, M.M. and Miraldo, M. (2008) Optimal contracts and contractual arrangements within the hospital::bargaining vs. take-it-or-leave-it offers. Working Paper. CHE Research Paper . Centre for Health Economics, University of York , York, UK.
Abstract
We study the impact of different contractual arrangements within the hospital on the optimal contracts designed by third party payers when severity is hospital's private information. We develop a multi-issue bargaining process between doctors and managers within the hospital. Results are then compared with a scenario where doctors and managers decide independently by maximizing their own profit, with managers proposing to doctors a take-it-or leave-it offer. Results show that, when the cost of capital is sufficiently low, the informational rent arising on information asymmetry is higher in a set up where managers and doctors decide together through a strategic bargaining process than when they act as two decision-making units.
Metadata
Item Type: | Monograph |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Keywords: | Strategic Bargaining,Optimal Contracts,Hospitals,Asymmetric Information |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Centre for Health Economics (York) The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Centre for Health Economics (York) > CHE Research Papers (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 12 Dec 2018 14:30 |
Last Modified: | 21 Jan 2025 18:30 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Centre for Health Economics, University of York |
Series Name: | CHE Research Paper |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:139949 |