Leng, Mary Catherine orcid.org/0000-0001-9936-5453 (2020) Debunking, Supervenience, and Hume's Principle. Canadian journal of philosophy. pp. 1083-1103. ISSN 0045-5091
Abstract
Debunking arguments against both moral and mathematical realism have been pressed, based on the claim that our moral and mathematical beliefs are insensitive to the moral/mathematical facts. In the mathematical case, I argue that the role of Hume’s Principle as a conceptual truth speaks against the debunkers’ claim that it is intelligible to imagine the facts about numbers being otherwise while our evolved responses remain the same. Analogously, I argue, the conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural speaks presents a difficulty for the debunker’s claim that, had the moral facts been otherwise, our evolved moral beliefs would have remained the same.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2019 Canadian Journal of Philosophy. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details. |
Keywords: | Hume’s principle,Mathematics,evolutionary debunking,metaethics,supervenience |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Funding Information: | Funder Grant number LEVERHULME TRUST RF-2016-24516 |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 19 Oct 2018 13:20 |
Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2025 23:10 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2019.1584936 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1080/00455091.2019.1584936 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:137431 |
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