Wenzel, T. (2014) Consumer myopia, competition and the incentives to unshroud add-on information. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 98. pp. 89-96. ISSN 0167-2681
Abstract
This paper studies unshrouding decisions in a framework similar to Gabaix and Laibson (2006), but considers an alternative unshrouding mechanism where the impact of advertising add-on information depends on the number of unshrouding firms. We show that shrouding becomes less prevalent as the number of competing firms increases. With unshrouding costs a non-monotonic relationship between the number of firms and unshrouding may arise.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2013 Elsevier. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). |
Keywords: | Bounded rationality; Add-on pricing; Shrouding |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 18 Oct 2018 15:55 |
Last Modified: | 19 Oct 2018 06:56 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.002 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.002 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:136975 |
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