Gu, Y. and Wenzel, T. (2014) Strategic obfuscation and consumer protection policy. Journal of Industrial Economics, 62 (4). pp. 632-660. ISSN 0022-1821
Abstract
This paper studies obfuscation decisions by firms. We show that more prominent firms are more likely to obfuscate. While prominent firms always choose maximum obfuscation, the obfuscation by less prominent firms depends on the degree of asymmetry in prominence and consumer protection policy. We evaluate the impact of a consumer protection policy that limits the scope of obfuscation. We show that such a policy may not be effective as less prominent firms may increase their obfuscation practice.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | This is the peer-reviewed version of the following article: Gu, Y. and Wenzel, T. (2014), Strategic Obfuscation and Consumer Protection Policy. J Ind Econ, 62: 632-660, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12060. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 23 Oct 2018 13:29 |
Last Modified: | 24 Oct 2018 06:04 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12060 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/joie.12060 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:136974 |
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