Gu, Y. and Wenzel, T. (2015) Putting on a tight leash and levelling playing field: An experiment in strategic obfuscation and consumer protection. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 42. pp. 120-128. ISSN 0167-7187
Abstract
The paper reports the results of an experiment where asymmetric sellers of a product can obfuscate the market. We show that policy measures may have unintended effects of increasing obfuscation incentives. We find that policies that limit the effectiveness of obfuscation and policies that promote parity between firms can lead less prominent firms to increase their obfuscation efforts. Despite this unintended effect, however, the former type of policies is effective in boosting consumer welfare.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2015 Elsevier. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in International Journal of Industrial Organization. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). |
Keywords: | Experiment; Obfuscation; Consumer protection; Behavioural industrial organisation |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 23 Oct 2018 13:34 |
Last Modified: | 24 Oct 2018 06:04 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.07.008 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.07.008 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:136972 |
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Filename: Putting on a Tight Leash and Levelling Playing.pdf
Licence: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0