Bennett, J. and Rablen, M. (2018) Bribery, Hold-Up and Bureaucratic Structure. Report. Sheffield Economic Research Paper Series (2018011). Department of Economics , University of Sheffield. ISSN 1749 -8368
Abstract
We analyze the provision of infrastructure by a foreign investor when the domestic bureaucracy is corrupt, but puts some weight on domestic welfare. The investor may pay a bribe in return for a higher provisional contract price. After the investment has been sunk, the bureaucracy may hold up the investor, using the threat of expropriation to demand a lower final price or another bribe. Depending on the level of care for domestic welfare, greater bureaucratic centralization may increase or decrease domestic welfare. Because of the threat of hold-up, bribery may result in greater domestic welfare than the honest benchmark does.
Metadata
Item Type: | Monograph |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2017 The Author(s). For reuse permissions, please contact the Author(s). |
Keywords: | bribery; hold-up; renegotiation; bureaucratic structure; centralized bureaucracy; decentralized bure |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) > Sheffield Economics Research Papers Series The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 15 Oct 2018 15:02 |
Last Modified: | 15 Oct 2018 15:04 |
Published Version: | https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/136779/1/paper_201... |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Department of Economics |
Series Name: | Sheffield Economic Research Paper Series |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:136779 |