Fichera, E, Gravelle, Hugh Stanley Emrys orcid.org/0000-0002-7753-4233, Pezzino, M et al. (1 more author) (2013) Choice of contracts for quality in health care: Evidence from the British NHS. Working Paper. CHE Research Paper . Centre for Health Economics, University of York , York, UK.
Abstract
We examine how public sector third-party purchasers and hospitals negotiate quality targets when a fixed proportion of hospital revenue is required to be linked to quality. We develop a bargaining model linking the number of quality targets to purchaser and hospital characteristics. Using data extracted from 153 contracts for acute hospital services in England in 2010/11, we find that the number of quality targets is determined by the purchaser's population health and its budget, the hospital type, whether the purchaser delegated negotiation to an agency, and the quality targets imposed by the supervising regional health authority.
Metadata
Item Type: | Monograph |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | CHE Research Paper 85 |
Keywords: | Contracts,quality,financial incentives, pay for performance, hospitals,Nash bargaining |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Centre for Health Economics (York) The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Centre for Health Economics (York) > CHE Research Papers (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 27 Sep 2018 13:20 |
Last Modified: | 16 Oct 2024 11:34 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Centre for Health Economics, University of York |
Series Name: | CHE Research Paper |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:136296 |
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