Orsini, C. (2016) Ownership and Exit Behavior: Evidence from the Home Health Care Market. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 16 (1). pp. 289-320.
Abstract
In the US health care system a high fraction of suppliers are not-for-profit companies. Some argue that non-profits are “for-profits in disguise” and I test this proposition in a quasi-experimental way by examining the exit behavior of home health care firms after a legislative change considerably reduced reimbursed visits per patient. The change allows me to construct a cross provider measure of restriction in reimbursement and to use this measure and time-series variation due to the passage of the law in my estimates. I find that exits among for-profit firms are higher than those of not-for-profit firms, rejecting the null that these sectors responded to the legislation in similar ways. In addition, my results expand the view that “not-for-profit” firms are a form of “trapped capital.” There is little capital investment in the home health care market, so the higher exit rates of for-profit firms after the law change indicate the possible role of labor inputs in generating differences in exit behavior across sectors.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2015 De Gruyter. |
Keywords: | long-term care; government restriction in Financing; not-for-profit |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 23 Oct 2018 15:08 |
Last Modified: | 28 Mar 2023 13:09 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2014-0044 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | De Gruyter |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1515/bejeap-2014-0044 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:136233 |