Ingram, David orcid.org/0000-0002-0184-9271 Thisnesses, Propositions, and Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Abstract
Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, should accept a thisness ontology, since it can do considerable work in defence of presentism. In this article, I propose a version of presentism that involves thisnesses of past and present entities and I argue that this view solves important problems facing standard versions of presentism.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details |
Institution: | The University of York |
Depositing User: | Dr David Ingram |
Date Deposited: | 01 Aug 2018 08:40 |
Last Modified: | 06 Dec 2018 01:39 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | DOI: 10.1111/papq.12181 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:133911 |