Thomas, J.L. orcid.org/0000-0003-0476-9848 (2018) Can Only Human Lives Be Meaningful? Philosophical Papers, 47 (2). pp. 265-297. ISSN 0556-8641
Abstract
Duncan Purves and Nicolas Delon have argued that one’s life will be meaningful to the extent that one contributes to valuable states of affairs and this contribution is a result of one’s intentional actions. They then argue, contrary to some theorists’ intuitions, that non-human animals are capable of fulfilling these requirements, and that this finding might entail important things for the animal ethics movement. In this paper, I also argue that things besides human beings can have meaningful existences, but I disagree with Purves and Delon’s theory of meaning, and some of the practical implications they suggest arise from their conclusion. Specifically, I argue that Purves and Delon are wrong to suggest that intentional agency is necessary for one’s life to be meaningful; contributing to valuable states of affairs can be sufficient by itself. Purves and Delon’s objection to such a claim is that it would allow even inanimate objects’ existences to count as meaningful. However, while I accept this consequence, I argue that it only seems counterintuitive because of two false beliefs they appear to hold: that some X cannot have a meaningful existence without that meaning (a) making X better off or (b) giving X reasons for pride.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Papers on 29 Jun 2018, available online: https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2017.1422793. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 23 Jul 2018 11:09 |
Last Modified: | 29 Dec 2019 01:38 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2017.1422793 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1080/05568641.2017.1422793 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:133256 |