De Luca, Giacomo Davide orcid.org/0000-0001-5376-9663, Sekeris, Petros G. and Spengler, Dominic Emanuel (2018) Can Violence Harm Cooperation? Experimental Evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. pp. 342-359. ISSN 0095-0696
Abstract
In this paper we argue that natural resource conservation is jeopardised by the ability of users to resort to violence to appropriate resources when they become scarce. We provide evidence from a lab experiment that participants interacting in a dynamic game of common pool resource extraction reduce their cooperation on efficient levels of resource extraction when given the possibility to appropriate the resource at some cost, i.e. through conflict. Theoretically, cooperation is achievable via the threat of punishment strategies, which stop being subgame perfect in the presence of conflict. Accordingly we argue that the observed reduction of cooperation in the game's early stages in the lab is a consequence of participants (correctly) anticipating the use of appropriation when resources become scarce.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Cooperation,Dynamic game,Experiment,Natural resource exploitation |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 04 Jul 2018 10:00 |
Last Modified: | 20 Feb 2025 00:08 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.06.008 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.06.008 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:132926 |
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