Brekke, Kurt R., Siciliani, Luigi orcid.org/0000-0003-1739-7289 and Straume, Odd Rune (2017) Hospital Mergers with Regulated Prices. Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 597–627. ISSN 1467-9442
Abstract
We study the effects of a hospital merger in a spatial competition framework where semi-altruistic hospitals choose quality and cost-containment effort. Whereas a merger always leads to higher average cost efficiency, the effect on quality provision depends on the strategic nature of quality competition, which in turn depends on the degree of altruism and the effectiveness of cost-containment effort. If qualities are strategic complements, then a merger leads to lower quality for all hospitals. If qualities are strategic substitutes, then a merger leads to higher quality for at least one hospital, and might also yield higher average quality provision and increased patient utility.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | Date of Acceptance: 09/12/2015. Embargo period: 24 months. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details |
Keywords: | Antitrust,I11,I18,L13,L44,cost efficiency,hospital mergers,quality competition |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 27 Jun 2018 08:30 |
Last Modified: | 10 Dec 2024 00:11 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12191 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/sjoe.12191 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:132649 |
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