Gustafsson, Carl Johan Eric orcid.org/0000-0002-9618-577X (2017) A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism. Analysis. pp. 705-715. ISSN 0003-2638
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Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 20 Jun 2018 09:20 |
Last Modified: | 08 Feb 2025 00:24 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx103 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/analys/anx103 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:132359 |
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Description: A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism