Lewis, J.H.P. orcid.org/0000-0001-6569-3096 (2018) The discretionary normativity of requests. Philosophers' Imprint, 18 (20). pp. 1-16. ISSN 1533-628X
Abstract
Being able to ask others to do things, and thereby giving them reasons to do those things, is a prominent feature of our interpersonal lives. In this paper, I discuss the distinctive normative status of requests – what makes them different from commands and demands. I argue for a theory of this normative phenomenon which explains the sense in which the reasons presented in requests are a matter of discretion. This discretionary quality, I argue, is something that other theories cannot accommodate, though it is a significant aspect of the relations that people stand in to one another, and the kinds of practical reasons that flow from those relations.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2018 James H. P. Lewis. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/018020/> |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 18 May 2018 09:36 |
Last Modified: | 11 Oct 2018 13:15 |
Published Version: | http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0018.020 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | University of Michigan |
Refereed: | Yes |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:130973 |
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