Vinay, S.E. and Kok, P. (2018) Extended analysis of the Trojan-horse attack in quantum key distribution. Physical Review A, 97 (4). 042335. ISSN 2469-9926
Abstract
The discrete-variable quantum key distribution protocols based on the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) are known to be secure against an eavesdropper, Eve, intercepting the flying qubits and performing any quantum operation on them. However, these protocols may still be vulnerable to side-channel attacks. We investigate the Trojan-horse side-channel attack where Eve sends her own state into Alice's apparatus and measures the reflected state to estimate the key. We prove that the separable coherent state is optimal for Eve among the class of multimode Gaussian attack states, even in the presence of thermal noise. We then provide a bound on the secret key rate in the case where Eve may use any separable state.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2018 American Physical Society. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Physical Review A. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Science (Sheffield) > Department of Physics and Astronomy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 15 May 2018 10:07 |
Last Modified: | 17 May 2018 15:17 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.97.042335 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | American Physical Society |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1103/PhysRevA.97.042335 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:130796 |