Skowron, Paul (2016) The Implications of Meno’s Paradox for the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Medical Law Review. pp. 379-395. ISSN 1464-3790
Abstract
Meno’s paradox—which asks ‘how will you know it is the thing you didn’t know?’—appears in Plato’s dialogue of the same name. This article suggests that a similar question arises in some supportive relationships. Attention to this question clarifies one condition necessary to justify making a best interests decisions against someone’s will: the decided-for person must be unable to recognise that they have failed to recognise a need. From this condition, two duties are derived: a duty to ensure that someone cannot recognise that they have failed to recognise a need before making a decision against their will; and a duty to provide consensual support to those who have had decisions made against their will, in order to help them to avoid such second-order failures of recognition in the future. The article assesses the Mental Capacity Act 2005 against each of these duties. For each duty, it finds that the Act allows compliance, but does not robustly require it.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | ©The Author 2016. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > The York Law School |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 23 Apr 2018 11:00 |
Last Modified: | 16 Oct 2024 14:41 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1093/medlaw/fww026 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/medlaw/fww026 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:129984 |