Gustafsson, Carl Johan Eric orcid.org/0000-0002-9618-577X (2019) Is Objective Act Consequentialism Satisfiable? Analysis. pp. 193-202. ISSN 0003-2638
Abstract
A compelling requirement on normative theories is that they should be satisfiable, that is, in every possible choice situation with a finite number of alternatives, there should be at least one performable act such that, if one were to perform that act, one would comply with the theory. In this paper, I argue that, given some standard assumptions about free will and counterfactuals, Objective Act Consequentialism violates this requirement.
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Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 04 Apr 2018 09:40 |
Last Modified: | 08 Feb 2025 00:28 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/any026 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/analys/any026 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:129253 |
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Description: Is Objective Act Consequentialism Satisfiable?