Gustafsson, Carl Johan Eric orcid.org/0000-0002-9618-577X (2018) Does the Collapsing Principle Rule Out Borderline Cases? Utilitas. pp. 483-492. ISSN 1741-6183
Abstract
If ‘F’ is a predicate, then ‘Fer than’ or ‘more F than’ is a corresponding comparative relational predicate. Concerning such comparative relations, John Broome's Collapsing Principle states that, for any x and y, if it is false that y is Fer than x and not false that x is Fer than y, then it is true that x is Fer than y. Luke Elson has recently put forward two counter-examples to this principle, allegedly showing that it yields contradictions if there are borderline cases. In this article, I argue that the Collapsing Principle does not rule out borderline cases, but I also argue that the principle is implausible.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | Publisher Copyright: © 2018 Cambridge University Press. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 03 Apr 2018 14:20 |
Last Modified: | 07 Feb 2025 00:19 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820818000079 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1017/S0953820818000079 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:129172 |
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Description: Does the Collapsing Principle Rule Out Borderline Cases_