Reuter, K. and Messerli, M (2017) How Not to Characterise a Hard Choice. Ratio, 30 (4). pp. 494-521. ISSN 0034-0006
Abstract
People are often faced with so called hard choices – also known as hard cases of comparison. In trying to characterize these hard choices, philosophers have made two central claims. First, failure of transitivity underlies hard cases of comparison. Second, using a random procedure is considered inappropriate in order to arrive at a decision in hard cases. While having some argumentative support, both claims primarily rely on expert intuitions. The results of the experiments we present in this paper challenge both claims, as well as the representativeness of expert intuitions that support these claims, by showing that most people (i) violate transitivity only if a hard choice is important, and (ii) find it appropriate to use a random procedure even in hard cases of comparison.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Reuter, K. and Messerli, M. (2017), How Not to Characterise a Hard Choice. Ratio, 30: 494–521, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12169. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. |
Keywords: | hard choices; transitivity; random procedure; experiments |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 01 Feb 2018 16:17 |
Last Modified: | 20 Jun 2019 00:38 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12169 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/rati.12169 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:126952 |