Faulkner, P.R. (2018) Giving the benefit of the doubt. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 26 (2). pp. 139-155. ISSN 0967-2559
Abstract
Faced with evidence that what is person said is false, we can nevertheless trust them and so believe what they say ó choosing to give them the benefit of the doubt. This is particularly notable when the person is a friend, or someone we are close to. Towards such persons, we demonstrate a remarkable epistemic partiality. We can trust, and so believe, our friends even when the balance of the evidence suggests that what they tell us is false. And insofar as belief is possible, it is also possible to acquire testimonial knowledge on those occasions when the friends know what they tell us. This paper seeks to explain these psychological and epistemological possibilities.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 29 Jan 2018 12:48 |
Last Modified: | 11 Nov 2020 14:13 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1080/09672559.2018.1440952 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:126485 |