Kobayashi, Y (2017) Economic Sanction as Foreign Policy. In: Thies, C, (ed.) Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford University Press
Abstract
Economic sanctions are an attempt by states to coerce a change in the policy of another state by restricting their economic relationship with the latter. Between, roughly, the 1960s–1980s, the question dominating the study of sanctions was whether they are an effective tool of foreign policy. Since the 1990s, however, with the introduction of large-N datasets, scholars have turned to more systematic examinations of previously little explored questions, such as when and how sanctions work, when and why states employ sanctions, and why some sanctions last longer than others. Two dominant perspectives, one based on strategic logic and the other on domestic politics, have emerged, providing starkly different answers to these questions. A growing body of evidence lends support to both strategic and domestic politics perspectives, but also points to areas in which they fall short. To complement these shortcomings, a new direction for research is to unite these perspectives into a single theoretical framework.
Metadata
Item Type: | Book Section |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Editors: |
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Keywords: | economic sanctions, sanctions effectiveness, foreign policy, domestic politics, bargaining models, selection bias, international trade, leader survival |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Education, Social Sciences and Law (Leeds) > School of Politics & International Studies (POLIS) (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 15 Jan 2018 15:44 |
Last Modified: | 15 Jan 2018 15:44 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.477 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:126198 |