Pickering, Andrew Christopher orcid.org/0000-0003-1545-2192 (2017) The Economic Consequences of Political Donation Limits. Economica. pp. 1-58. ISSN 1468-0335
Abstract
The economic consequences of limits on political donations depend on the degree of political competition. Donors, who are ideologically aligned with candidates, decide how much to contribute to their own candidate. They may benefit from rent-seeking by their own candidate but dislike rent-seeking by the opposition. Increased rent-seeking by politicians thus generates campaign contributions for themselves but also mobilizes donations to the opposing candidate, potentially to a greater extent. This latter effect acts as a deterrent to rent-seeking when contributions finance electoral campaigns and positively affect election chances. When political competition is low, incumbent donors outnumber opposition donors and limits reduce rent-seeking. When political competition is high, donors are equalized and laissez-faire reduces rent-seeking. Consistent with these hypotheses, data from the US states suggest that limits are associated with better policies and stronger growth performance at low levels of political competition, whilst laissez-faire is preferred when political competition is high.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2017 The London School of Economics and Political Science. Published by Blackwell Publishing. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 04 Dec 2017 11:40 |
Last Modified: | 21 Oct 2024 23:53 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12260 |
Status: | Published online |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/ecca.12260 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:124811 |