Crerar, C.B. (2017) Motivational approaches to intellectual vice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96 (4). pp. 753-766. ISSN 0004-8402
Abstract
Despite the now considerable literature on intellectual virtue, there remains relatively little philosophical discussion of intellectual vice. What discussion there is has been shaped by a powerful assumption—that, just as intellectual virtue requires that we are motivated by epistemic goods, intellectual vice requires that we aren't. In this paper, I demonstrate that this assumption is false: motivational approaches cannot explain a range of intuitive cases of intellectual vice. The popularity of the assumption is accounted for by its being a manifestation of a more general understanding of vice as an inversion or mirror image of virtue. I call this the inversion thesis, and argue that the failure of the motivational approach to vice exposes its limitations. I conclude by suggesting that recognizing these limitations can help to encourage philosophical interest in intellectual vice.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2017 Australasian Association of Philosophy. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Virtue epistemology; intellectual vice; motivations; the inversion thesis; intellectual virtue |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 13 Oct 2017 10:26 |
Last Modified: | 22 Dec 2023 09:46 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1080/00048402.2017.1394334 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:122369 |