Olson, E.T. (2002) What does functionalism tell us about personal identity? Nous, 36 (4). pp. 682-698. ISSN 0029-4624
Abstract
Sydney Shoemaker argues that the functionalist theory of mind entails a psychological-continuity view of personal identity, as well as providing a defense of that view against a crucial objection. I show that his view has surprising consequences, e.g. that no organism could have mental properties and that a thing's mental properties fail to supervene even weakly on its microstructure and surroundings. I then argue that the view founders on "fission" cases and rules out our being material things. Functionalism tells us little if anything about personal identity.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | Copyright © 2002 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Nous. The definitive version is available from http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0068.00407 |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Repository Officer |
Date Deposited: | 24 May 2006 |
Last Modified: | 05 Jun 2014 06:01 |
Published Version: | http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111... |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Blackwell Publishing |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/1468-0068.00407 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:1220 |