Olson, E.T. (2001) Personal identity and the radiation argument. Analysis, 61 (269). pp. 38-44. ISSN 1467-8284
Abstract
Sydney Shoemaker has argued that, because we can imagine a people who take themselves to survive a 'brain-state-transfer' procedure, cerebrum transplant, or the like, we ought to conclude that we could survive such a thing. I claim that the argument faces two objections, and can be defended only by depriving it any real interest.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | Copyright © 2001 Eric T. Olson. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Analysis. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Repository Officer |
Date Deposited: | 24 May 2006 |
Last Modified: | 05 Jun 2014 17:12 |
Published Version: | http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1... |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Blackwell Publishing - Published on behalf of the Analysis Trust |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/1467-8284.00267 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:1219 |