Olivella, Pau and Siciliani, Luigi orcid.org/0000-0003-1739-7289 (2017) Reputational Concerns with Altruistic Providers. Journal of Health Economics. pp. 1-13. ISSN 0167-6296
Abstract
We study a model of reputational concerns when doctors differ in their degree of altruism and they can signal their altruism by their (observable) quality. When reputational concerns are high, following the introduction or enhancement of public reporting, the less altruistic (bad) doctor mimics the more altruistic (good) doctor. Otherwise, either a separating or a semi-separating equilibrium arises: the bad doctor mimics the good doctor with probability less than one. Pay-for-performance incentive schemes are unlikely to induce crowding out, unless some dimensions of quality are unobservable. Under the pooling equilibrium a purchaser can implement the first-best quality by appropriately choosing a simple payment scheme with a fixed price per unit of quality provided. This is not the case under the separating equilibrium. Therefore, policies that enhance public reporting complement pay-for-performance schemes.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2017, Elsevier B.V. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details. |
Keywords: | Altruism,Doctors,Name and shame policies,Pay for performance,Reputation |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 12 Jul 2017 11:15 |
Last Modified: | 13 Feb 2025 05:25 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.05.003 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.05.003 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:118940 |