Noordhof, Paul Jonathan Pitt orcid.org/0000-0001-5222-2439 and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema Louise (2017) Another Defence of Owens’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims. Logos and Episteme. pp. 147-153. ISSN 2069-0533
Abstract
David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded to this objection by appeal to other deliberative contexts in which the aim could be weighed, and we argued that this response to Owens failed for two reasons. Steglich-Petersen has since responded to our defence of Owens’s objection. Here we reply to Steglich- Petersen and conclude, once again, that Owens’s challenge to the truth-aim approach remains to be answered.
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Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © Logos & Episteme, 2017. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 26 Apr 2017 11:20 |
Last Modified: | 15 Mar 2025 00:06 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:115642 |
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