Williams, N.W. (2018) Kidnapping an ugly child: Is William James a pragmaticist? British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 26 (1). pp. 154-175. ISSN 0960-8788
Abstract
Since the term ‘pragmatism’ was first coined, there have been debates about who is or is not a ‘real’ pragmatist, and what that might mean. The division most often drawn in contemporary pragmatist scholarship is between William James and Charles Peirce. Peirce is said to present a version of pragmatism which is scientific, logical and objective about truth, whereas James presents a version which is nominalistic, subjectivistic and leads to relativism. The first person to set out this division was in fact Peirce himself, when he distinguished his own ‘pragmaticism’ from the broad pragmatism of James and others. Peirce sets out six criteria which defines ‘pragmaticism’: the pragmatic maxim; a number of ‘preliminary propositions’; prope-positivism; metaphysical inquiry; critical common-sensism; and scholastic realism. This paper sets out to argue that in fact James meets each of these criteria, and should be seen as a ‘pragmaticist’ by Peirce’s own lights.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2017 BSHP. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in British Journal for the History of Philosophy. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | William James; Charles S. Peirce; nominalism; scholastic realism; pragmatism |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 21 Apr 2017 10:00 |
Last Modified: | 07 Nov 2023 09:19 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1080/09608788.2017.1358140 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:115189 |